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Philosopher: Today, I suggest we discuss the important concepts of common
knowledge and common belief. As far as I know, the first one to give a
formal analysis of these concepts was the philosopher David Lewis, in his
book Convention [26]. One of his examples is traffic conventions, about the
role of common knowledge in how one behaves in road traffic. To explain this
properly, I wonder if you would care to play a little game with me.
Cognitive Scientist: Sure.
Philosopher: Imagine yourself driving on a one-lane road. You have just come
out of the Channel Tunnel on the British side and it is well-known that drivers
who just went from France to England, or vice versa, tend to forget on which
side of the road they have to drive, particularly if they find themselves on a
quiet one-lane road where they are suddenly confronted with oncoming traffic.
In case traffic comes towards you from the other direction, you will have to
swerve a bit to the side to let it pass. In fact, you each have to swerve a bit.
Economist: Ah, this is beginning to sound familiar! If you swerve, you’re
a chicken. If not, and if you force the other to swerve, you’re a tough guy.
Unfortunately, when two tough guys come together, they will crash. There is
interesting equilibrium behavior in examples like this. It’s a standard setting
for a two-person game in game theory [7].
Philosopher: Yes, you are right, but that is not what I wanted to explain. (To
the cognitive scientist again:) Will you swerve left or right?
Cognitive Scientist: Well, if I remember that I am in England, where people
have to drive on the left, I will swerve left. Otherwise, I will swerve right.
Philosopher: Yes, and how about the guy coming towards you? He and you
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may both be cautious drivers, but if he will swerve right and you left, you
will still crash. The point is that it is not enough for you and the on-comer
both to know that you have to drive left. You would also like to know that
the other knows. And this will affect your behavior. Wouldn’t you agree that
you will drive more cautiously—and swerve slightly more to the left—if you
are uncertain whether the oncoming driver also knows that he has to drive
on the left, than when you know that he knows to drive on the left?
Cognitive Scientist: Surely.
Philosopher: Then we are approaching common knowledge. Because surely
you then also agree that this holds for the other driver as well. Now if you
knew that the other driver did not know whether you knew to drive on the
left, would that still affect your driving behavior?
Cognitive Scientist: It seems reasonable to be slightly more cautious when
I do not know if he knows that I know, than when I know that he knows
that I know, as his driving behavior will be slightly less predictable given
his doubt about my knowledge—he might be tempted to avoid collision by a
last-minute unexpected strong swerve to the right instead of to the left, if he
were to think—incorrectly—that I am initiating that too.
Philosopher: Exactly. You are very cautious if you do not know, slightly less
cautious if you know but not if the other knows, even less cautious if you
know and also know that the other knows but not if he knows that, and so
on: by repeating the above argument, you will all the time become slightly
more confident about the other’s road behavior but never entirely so. Driving
on the left-hand side is what Lewis calls a convention, and this means that
you know that I know that you know. . . up to any finite stack of knowledge
operators.
Economist: As another instance of how relevant the concept of common
knowledge is, you may care to mention that analyzing the properties of com-
mon belief is what earned the economist Robert Aumann the 2006 Nobel
Prize for economics. In fact, independently from the logicians and philoso-
phers, Aumann developed the concepts of common knowledge and common
belief as ways to describe perfect rationality. Strategic choice assumes such
common knowledge of each other’s possible actions.
Computer Scientist: Ah, Aumann on agreeing to disagree. I have a surprise
for you here. Recently at a very interesting workshop on new directions in
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game theory in Amsterdam, the famous game theorist Dov Samet gave me a
copy of an article by sociologist Morris Friedell, “On the structure of shared
awareness”, that already appeared in January 1969 in Behavioral Science [19].
This is based on a technical report from 1967, so it is even earlier than Lewis’
much less technical book. Friedell’s paper contains a proper definition of com-
mon knowledge, and it also has a wealth of fascinating examples of common
knowledge in social situations. In fact, without knowing it, many later au-
thors on common knowledge are just expanding on examples introduced by
Friedell. So if anyone is the father of common knowledge, it is Friedell.
Economist: It is commonly believed among economists that Aumann was the
first to give a formal analysis of common knowledge.
Philosopher: And it is commonly believed among philosophers that Lewis was
the first.
Logician: But what Dov Samet was telling my colleague here shows that those
common beliefs were wrong. A nice illustration of the fact that common beliefs
may happen to be false.
Philosopher: Unlike cases of common knowledge. Maybe even something
stronger was true: maybe it was commonly believed among economists that
it was common knowledge that Aumann was the first to give this formal
analysis. And that common belief was also false.
Computer Scientist: Friedell also has interesting things to say about ways
of achieving common knowledge. Our dear Philosopher makes it sound like
common knowledge is very hard to achieve. But that would be a mistake.
Common knowledge is often easily achieved, by means of public announce-
ment.
Cognitive Scientist: And what do you mean by public announcement, exactly?
Computer Scientist: Well, I suppose a public announcement is an event where
something is being said aloud, while everybody is aware of who is present, and
it is already common knowledge that all present are awake and aware, and
that everybody hears the announcement, and that everybody is aware of the
fact that everybody hears it, and . . .
Cognitive Scientist: Ahem, an example may be clearer.
Computer Scientist: OK, at your service. It is already common knowledge
among us that no one here has hearing difficulties and that everyone is wide
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awake, right? (In a loud solemn voice:) I herewith announce to you all that
the concert by Heleen Verleur and Rene´e Harp will take place on January
25. (In a lower voice again:) There you are. The date of the concert is now
commonly known among the five of us.
Economist: Actually, this concert has already been announced by internal
NIAS e-mail. But the thing is, several fellows don’t read their e-mail, or only
very irregularly. Should we still consider these e-mail notifications as proper
public announcements?
Philosopher: I have a hard time remembering all those e-mails that I receive
here.
Logician: There are various scenarios for which one can prove that it is im-
possible to achieve or increase a group’s common knowledge [25; 28; 15].
Computer Scientist: I suppose the fact that fellows don’t read their e-mails
means that that channel is unreliable. Analysis of message passing through
unreliable channels is old hat in computer science. We call it the problem of
the two generals, or the coordinated attack problem Would anyone like me to
elaborate?
Cognitive Scientist: Yes, please.
Computer Scientist: To immediately make the link with the topic at hand: it
was proved by Halpern and Moses [21] that message exchange in a distributed
environment, where there is no guarantee that messages get delivered, cannot
create common knowledge. They use the example of two generals who are
planning a coordinated attack on a city. The generals are on two hills on
opposite sides of the city, each with their own army, and they know they
can only succeed in capturing the city if their two armies attack at the same
time. But the valley that separates the two hills is in enemy hands, and any
messengers that are sent from one army base to the other run a severe risk to
get captured. The generals have agreed on a joint attack, but they still have
to settle the time.
Philosopher: So the generals start sending messengers. But they cannot be
sure that the messengers succeed in delivering their message. And if they get
through, there is no guarantee that the message of acknowledgement will get
delivered. And so on.
Computer Scientist: You got the picture.
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Philosopher: Suppose the general who sends the first messenger keeps sending
messengers, all with the same story, until he gets an acknowledgement back,
and then he keeps sending messengers to confirm the acknowledgement?
Computer Scientist: That procedure is known in computer science as the
“alternating bit protocol” for sending bits over an unreliable channel. The
sender repeats the transmission of a bit until an acknowledgement is received,
then the sender acknowledges the receiver’s acknowledgment until that is in
turn acknowledged by the receiver, and only then the next bit is sent until
that bit gets acknowledged, and so on.
Logician: The alternating bit protocol is also covered by Halpern and Moses’
impossibility result. After the bit gets through, the receiver knows the value
of the bit. After the acknowledgement gets back, the sender knows that
the receiver knows the value of the bit. After the acknowledgement of the
acknowledgement gets back, the receiver knows that the sender knows that
the receiver knows the value of the bit, and if this gets confirmed, the sender
knows that the receiver knows that the sender knows that the receiver knows
the value of the bit. Still, this will not achieve common knowledge .
Philosopher: OK, you have made it quite plausible that message passing
through unreliable channels cannot create common knowledge. And NIAS
e-mail is perhaps not the proper medium for NIAS public announcements.
But maybe we should turn it around: what are the properties of events that
succeed in creating common knowledge? It seems to me that they all involve
a shared awareness that a common experience takes place. It can involve
various senses: hearing, seeing, maybe even touching or smelling.
Computer Scientist: This is getting sensual. Maybe intimate experiences such
as eye-contact and touching are privileged in creating common knowledge?
Friedell formulates the following obvious but important principle:
If B sees A look at B, then A sees B look at A. From this and a few sim-
pler properties one can demonstrate that eye contact leads to common
knowledge of the presence of the interactants. It is no coincidence that
eye contact is of considerable emotional and normative significance [19,
page 34].
Cognitive Scientist: Would you stop looking me in the eye so intently, dear
Computer Scientist? We already have common knowledge that we’re both
here. . . (blushes)
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Computer Scientist: Indeed, here are those touchy situations that Friedell also
analyzes, where some proposition is common knowledge, but the participants
mutually pretend that the contrary proposition is the case [19]. If I’m not
mistaken, such “open secret” situations will be extensively discussed during
the NIAS lecture closing off our project (see page ??).
Philosopher: There is a nice philosophy paper by Clark and Marshall about
common knowledge as a background for mutual reference in discourse. They
remark that common knowledge is often established by what they call “co-
presence” [9].
Cognitive Scientist: Yes, but how does one know that an announcement has
become common knowledge? I might have let my attention wander for a
moment, or I might have misheard you. Actually, for smelling one would
prefer some things not to be commonly observed. It is common practice in
polite society to pretend one does not notice certain smells. This prevents
what is generally known from becoming common knowledge.
Philosopher: I would put that differently. I would say it makes it possible to
pretend of things that are in fact already common knowledge that they are
not.
Computer Scientist: Seriously, whether you paid attention or not may not be
the point. If an announcement is made, you were supposed to pay attention,
and therefore the information can now be assumed common knowledge.
Philosopher: That is what happens in the public arena all the time. At the
basis of legal relations between individuals and the state, or of the mutual
legal relations between individuals, is the assumption that the law is common
knowledge.
Cognitive Scientist: But this is a fiction. Professional lawyers have a full-time
job to keep up with the law. Ordinary citizens can simply not be expected to
cope.
Philosopher: You may call it a fiction. I prefer to say that it is a necessary
presumption. Roman lawgivers found out long ago that if citizens within their
jurisdiction could plead innocence because of being unaware of the law, no
offender could ever get convicted. So they were quick to invent principles like
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat, “ignorance of the law excuses no one”.
Computer Scientist: And the counterpart of that is that the laws have to be
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properly published and distributed. By being printed in a government gazette
that every citizen has access to, for instance. Of course, the citizens are not
supposed to read all that boring stuff. What matters is that they should be
able to find out about it whenever they want. In this way, the publications
in the government gazette amount to public announcements.
Cognitive Scientist: This connects to the conventions of driving that we
started our discussion with. The traffic regulations are assumed to be com-
mon knowledge, although few people will be able to accurately reproduce all
traffic rules. But if you are ignorant of the rules and cause a traffic accident,
you are obviously still liable.
Philosopher: To prepare for this discussion I reread a classic publication from
1978 analyzing the concept of common knowledge, by Jane Heal [22]. Still
a nice piece of philosophical exposition. The introduction is fabulous. Her
work anticipates combining reasoning about knowledge and plausibility. If
we’re having dinner together and I drop a hot potato, it may be that
I know that I have dropped that potato and so do you; but I hope and
I believe that you do not know, and you hope that I do not know that
you know” [22, p.116]
It also anticipates ways of linking knowledge to action for which, as far as
I know, even now no good explanations can be given. Consider two agents,
separated by a screen, who both repeatedly select one option from a set of
many, simultaneously. When their selection is the same, a reward is given,
and it is assumed to be common knowledge that they both get notified when
that happens. But the notifications are private.
Computer Scientist: I don’t think that is miraculous at all. This is a case
where the private announcement “you get a reward for this choice” can achieve
the effect of a public announcement, just because it is already commonly known
that whenever one player gets the private announcement, the other player gets
it as well. So what will happen is that after the first random common choice
of C, the two players will keep choosing C to get rewarded again.
Philosopher: Ahem—exactly.
Computer Scientist: Michael Suk-Young Chwe’s book Rational Ritual [8] also
discusses such matters. Interestingly, Chwe pays attention to the size of
groups for which common knowledge gets established. A brand name that
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is common knowledge in a large group is worth a lot of money. Chwe ana-
lyzes the example of advertisements broadcasted during the American football
Super Bowl. He compares the enormous cost of making something common
knowledge by means of such advertisements to the obvious benefits. Part of
the benefit is in the fact that the advertisements create common knowledge.
An important consideration when deciding to buy a blu-ray media player, for
example, is the knowledge that others are going to buy it too. The common
knowledge created by an advertisement in the break of a nationwide TV-event
gives the reassurance that lots of titles will soon become available in the new
format.
Cognitive Scientist: I know that book. Actually, Chwe uses the example of
the announcement of the new Apple Macintosh computer during a football
Super Bowl, in 1984 I think. What I particularly like about the book is that
it treats formal issues in a lucid not-technical way. But it assumes a firm
grasp of technicalities, such as the distinction between general knowledge and
common knowledge.
Logician: General knowledge among the members of a group of agents means
that all individuals in the group know a certain fact, and common knowledge
means: everybody knows that everybody knows, and so on [28; 15].
Computer Scientist: Let me propose a definition of common knowledge. A
proposition ϕ is common knowledge if everybody knows that ϕ and everybody
knows that ϕ is common knowledge.
Philosopher: That can hardly qualify as a definition. What you are saying is
obviously circular. Besides, if I know that ϕ is common knowledge, then it
logically follows that ϕ is common knowledge, for knowledge implies truth.
Computer Scientist: Yes, of course, but the definition states an equivalence.
Truth does not in general imply knowledge, but in the case of common knowl-
edge it does. If ϕ is common knowledge, then I know (and you know) that ϕ
is common knowledge. And the circularity is not vicious.
Philosopher: I am of course familiar with recursive definitions, with a base
case and a recursive case.
Computer Scientist: But this is an instance of what in computer science
is known as a definition by co-recursion. Co-recursive definitions are like
recursive definitions, but with the crucial difference that there is no base
case. And they define infinite objects. Let me give you a simple example. An
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infinite stream of zeros, call it zeros, can be defined as: zeros equals a zero
followed by zeros. In lazy functional programming this is written as
zeros = 0 : zeros
If you execute this program in Haskell you will get an infinite stream of zeros
flashing over your screen.
Philosopher: I suppose you mean an initial segment of an infinite list?
Computer Scientist: Yes, that is what I mean, of course. Even you are bound
to get bored at some point, and break it off.
Philosopher: Ahem, nice example. Haskell is a programming language, I
suppose?
Computer Scientist: Haskell is a language for functional programming, well
suited for defining programs by co-recursion. As you can see from the example,
Haskell uses colon for putting an element in front of a list. If you are interested,
I can give you a reference to a textbook on Haskell programming with a whole
chapter devoted to co-recursive definitions.1 And I hope to have convinced you
that my definition of common knowledge was as acceptable as my definition
of the stream of zeros.
Philosopher: Yes, your recursive definition does make intuitive sense.
Computer Scientist: It is a co-recursive definition, not a recursive definition.
Philosopher: Thank you. I will try to keep the distinction in mind, at least
while you are present. But let us move to the distinction between distributed
knowledge and common knowledge. Am I right in saying that distributed
knowledge is what a group would know if it had pooled their knowledge? If I
know that p implies q, and you know p, then we have distributed knowledge
of q.
Computer Scientist: Yes, that’s right. Suppose Alice knows that p, Bob knows
that p implies q, and Carol knows that q implies r. Then if they combine
their resources they can figure out together that r is the case, so they have
distributed knowledge that r. One obvious way to make r common knowledge
is for Alice to shout p, for Bob to reply with announcing that p implies q, and
therefore q, and for Carol to conclude by stating loudly that q implies r, and
1Doets and van Eijck [13].
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therefore r. In short, they each make a public announcement of what they
know, and their distributed knowledge turns into common knowledge.
Logician: Your example illustrates the difference quite nicely. Let us use Cp
to express that p is common knowledge. If I know that p and you know that p
implies q, these together do not imply Cq. But if Cp and C(p→ q) then Cq.
If p and p→ q are common knowledge then the conclusion q is also common
knowledge.
Computer Scientist: Indeed, that is all in accordance with the definition that
I gave you.
Economist: (smiling) Well, it is common knowledge among economists that
the analysis of common belief is crucial for understanding the way the stock-
market functions. There may be rules of thumb for computing the value of
stock like ‘a share in company X should not cost more than twenty times the
profit per share of company X’, but these are not practical.
Philosopher: I suppose these days it is quite uncommon for companies to have
an uninterrupted existence of twenty years. Without mergers or split-ups, I
mean. Besides, nobody is willing to look that far ahead.
Economist: John Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money [23] has something amusing to say about this:
[..] professional investment may be likened to those newspaper compe-
titions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor
whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the
competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those
faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest
to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at
the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choos-
ing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest,
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to
anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.
And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher
degrees.
That is from Chapter Twelve, called “The State of Long-term Expectation”.
Philosopher: You impress me. So you do really know your classics by heart?
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Economist: Well, to be completely honest with you, I admit that I looked this
one up for the occasion.
Philosopher: Your quote is interesting, for it talks about levels of mutual
belief, and in the limit about common belief. The prize in the beauty contest
goes not to the person who picks the prettiest girl, but to the person who
picks the girl that is commonly believed to be the prettiest girl. If Keynes is
right that the stock-market is about common belief, then the value of a share
is what people believe it is. As long as a stock is commonly believed to be
worth a lot, it does not matter if it is overvalued.
Economist: Until a stock-market crash occurs. Keynes himself was an avid
speculator, and his friends had to bail him out during the crash that preceded
the Great Depression.
Logician: That reminds me of the current credit crunch. I’m afraid that
epistemic logic and the concept of common belief do not suffice to explain
what’s going on there. For example, imagine a rumor that a bank is going
to go bankrupt. The rumor may be false, but it can start a chain reaction
which results in the bank actually going bankrupt. If we want to be serious
about social software, we need to be able to explain such a phenomenon, and
possibly even to devise mechanisms to prevent them.
Economist: In fact, it does seem to me that epistemic game theory and behav-
ioral game theory can already account for both epistemic and psychological
aspects of the agents. In a recent paper by Bicchieri and Xiao [6], for example,
the authors take on the challenge to investigate how social norms influence
individual decision making. It turns out that what we expect others to do
significantly predicts our own choices, much more than what we expect others
to think we ought to do. Such findings are important if you want to design
policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior 2.
Computer Scientist: So all this talk by the Dutch prime minister about norms
and values will not influence the Dutch citizens’ behavior one iota if we do
not see the desired behavior around us.
Logician: That’s what I always tell my spouse: It doesn’t help to tell our
children not to smoke or drink or lie: We should consistently set the right
example. It’s sure tiring to be a parent. . .
2These remarks about the 2008 credit crunch were inspired by contributions to an e-mail
discussion by Rohit Parikh, Adam Brandenburger and Cristina Bicchieri.
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Cognitive Scientist: Speaking about psychological aspects and children, com-
mon knowledge must also be relevant for what in cognitive science and psy-
chology is known as ‘theory of mind’. Around the age of four, children appear
to develop a notion of another person’s mind. They discover that what others
think can be different from their own thoughts and that you can explain and
predict other people’s behavior in terms of their mental states. A well-known
setting is the ‘Sally-Anne’ experiment3 where a doll, Sally, puts a marble into
her basket and then leaves the scene. While Sally is away and cannot see what
happens, Anne takes the marble out of Sally’s basket, and places it into her
own box. Sally then returns and children have to answer the question where
Sally will first look for her marble. Only from the age of four, children seeing
the marble being moved will anticipate that Sally, who has not observed this
move, will therefore later not know the new location of the marble.
Philosopher: Ah, that would explain why under-four-year-olds do not see the
fun of performing magic tricks, for instance. The child knows that the coin
is hidden beneath the sheet of paper, and the audience pretends to believe it
has disappeared, and starts uttering sighs of amazement.
Logician: Yes, my five-year-old daughter loves that. Of course, the grown-ups
have to play along by displaying their complete bafflement.
Logician: There may well be a relation between how conventions are formed
in general and how a theory of mind develops in children. It seems only one
step from whether you know that the other knows the location of a ball, to
whether you know that the other knows on which side of the road to drive.
But in such psychological experiments the higher-order setting never plays a
role, as far as I know.
Cognitive Scientist: The standard setting of the Sally-Anne experiment does
not test for higher-order aspects of knowledge: the child only needs to make
a first-order false-belief attribution, that Sally believes that the marble is still
in her own basket.
Logician: But recent investigations4 pay special attention to just that higher-
order aspect, and discuss experimental settings that corroborate the emer-
gence of higher-order theory of mind, but only after the age of about six. It
appears that even adults have some difficulty in applying third-order attribu-
tions such as “John doesn’t know that Alice believes that he wrote a novel
3By Wimmer and Perner [35].
4See, e.g., [29; 34; 16].
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under pseudonym”. That is, of course, if they are not logicians.
Cognitive Scientist: Wow, if reasoning on three orders is already so hard for
most of us, how can people ever draw correct conclusions about common
knowledge, with all that complicated co-recursion it involves?
Economist: Indeed, it seems that in game settings people often just approxi-
mate common knowledge by a low stack of “we know that we know...”, maybe
only three or four levels [33].
Philosopher: Ah, now we are back on the English road where we started our
discussion! As long as we know that we know that we know to drive on the
left, we feel safe enough to proceed without swerving. At least I do.
Economist: I hope you don’t mind if I get serious again. In “Agreeing to
disagree” [1] Aumann introduces common knowledge as “everybody knows
that everybody knows that ...”. In the economics setting, instead of different
possible situations—such as driving on the left, or on the right—the preferred
model is that of different probable situations, and how events relate prior to
posterior probabilities. Aumann shows that if agents have common knowledge
of their posterior probabilities of an event, that these must then be the same.
In other words, they can only agree to agree and they cannot agree to disagree.
His presentation is elementary but it would still carry a bit too far to explain
the details here.
Logician: What do you mean, carry us too far? Let me explain, then. The
easiest way to explain what is behind Aumann’s proof is this. It is not rational
to agree to disagree, in an economic context at least, because this agreement
would entail awareness of the fact that the disagreement can be exploited.
What does it mean that you believe that the probability of an event is one
half? Simply that if you are taking bets on this, then you will consider a bet
with a return of two to one a fair bet. And if you believe that the probability
is one in four and you are in a betting mood, then you will consider a bet
with a return of four to one (including the stake) a fair bet.
Computer Scientist: Isn’t that what bookies call an odds of three to one
against? If the event happens you win three times your stake, otherwise you
lose your stake.
Logician: That’s right. Now consider what happens if I know that you believe
that the probability of Barack Obama winning the presidential election is one
fourth, and you know that I believe that this probability is one half. Then I
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know that you are willing to take odds of three to one against, and you know
that I am willing to take only equal bets. Then we should both be aware
of the fact that someone can make money out of us, irrespective of how the
election turns out.
Computer Scientist: Ah, I see. Assume Hillary Clinton places her bet of a
thousand bucks with the guy who offers odds of three to one against Barack
winning, and bets for two thousand bucks that Barack will lose with the guy
who offers equal odds. If Barack wins, Hillary collects three thousand bucks
from the first guy and loses her stake with the other, so she gains a thousand
bucks. If Barack loses, Hillary loses her stake with the first guy but collects
two thousands bucks from the other bloke, so again she pockets a profit of a
thousand bucks.
Philosopher: Isn’t that what gamblers call a Dutch book?
Logician: That’s right. A Dutch book, a set of odds and bets which guarantees
a profit, regardless of the outcome of the gamble, is what we have here. That’s
why agreeing to disagree is not rational for people who are willing to put their
beliefs to the test by taking bets.
Philosopher: The explanation of degree of belief in terms of willingness to
act, or to take bets, reminds me of Frank Ramsey’s famous foundation of
probability theory in terms of degrees of belief [32]. Ramsey remarks that the
frequency account of probability does not explain what we mean by probability
in cases of non-repeatable events. The election or non-election of Barack
Obama is an example.
Logician: Actually the proof that Aumann gives does not involve betting or
Dutch books. It is simply the observation that if ϕ is common knowledge be-
tween Alice and Bob, then ϕ has to hold in a set of members of the knowledge
partition for Alice, and similarly for Bob.
Economist: There is also more recent stuff: in game theory, a lot of work is
made of the analysis of strategic choice under assumptions of limited rational-
ity. A case of opponent modeling where common knowledge is absent would
be an example [14].
Philosopher: I am still wondering about this funny kind of definition that you
call co-recursion. It seems like some kind of infinitary process is going on. How
can we make sure it ever stops? I mean, imagine sending a romantic email,
with ‘I adore you’ or that sort of thing. You get a reply “I am so glad to know
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that you adore me”, you send a reply back “Now I am delighted, for I know
that you know that I adore you”, only to get an exciting response: “How sweet
for me to know that you know that I know that you adore me.” Obviously,
this nonsense could go on forever, and never achieve common knowledge of
the basic romantic fact.
Logician: That’s brilliant. For it does never stop if you do it like this. But if
the two lovebirds get together, they may still go through the whole exchange
that you mentioned, but only for the fun of it. For the first “I adore you”
creates common knowledge.
Economist: Of course. And there are lots of everyday examples where the
creation of common knowledge is crucial. Indeed, certain rituals are designed
for it, and it is unwise not to observe them. Take the old-fashioned ritual
that takes place when you withdraw a large amount of money from your bank
account and have it paid out to you in cash by the cashier. The cashier
will look at you earnestly to make sure she has your full attention, and then
she will slowly count out the banknotes for you: one thousand (counting ten
notes), two thousand (counting another ten notes), three thousand (ten notes
again), and four thousand (another ten notes). This ritual creates common
knowledge that forty banknotes of a hundred dollars were paid out to you.
Philosopher: Such rituals are important, indeed. Suppose you have four thou-
sand bucks in an envelope, and you hand it over to a friend who is going to
do a carpentry job at your home, say. Then what if this friend calls you later
with dismay in his voice, and the message that there were just thirty-five
banknotes in the envelope?
Economist: Then you are in trouble indeed, for you have failed to create
common knowledge that the forty notes were there when you handed over
the envelope. You failed to observe an important ritual, and this failure may
result in the end of a friendship.
Logician: Maybe you only got what you deserved. Why pay for a carpentry
job in cash unless one of you wants to fool the tax office?
Philosopher: Let us move on to the logic of common knowledge. How do we
know that the concept of common knowledge is well-defined? And how do we
know that common knowledge can be achieved in a finite number of steps?
Logician: The answer to the first question lies in a famous theorem by Tarski
and Knaster. Let F be the operation of mapping a set of situations X to the
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set of situations where X is general knowledge and where F (X) is also general
knowledge. Then this operation is monotonic. This means that it preserves
the ordering on situations. If X is less informative than Y then F (X) will
also be less informative then F (Y ). Then F is guaranteed to have a fixpoint.
Philosopher: What do you mean by “less informative”?
Economist: And what is a fixpoint?
Logician: What ‘less informative’ means depends on the context. For sets of
situations this will be reverse inclusion. If you can exclude more situations,
you know more. Anyhow, Tarski and Knaster [24] prove that all monotonic
functions have fixpoints. A fixpoint or fixed-point of a function F is a value
X for which F (X) = X 5.
Computer Scientist: Here is an easy example. The Dutch mathematician and
philosopher of mathematics Brouwer proved a famous theorem stating that
every continuous function from a compact convex set into itself has a fixpoint.
Each map of the town of Wassenaar, where we are located here at NIAS, can
be seen as the image of a continuous function that maps the real town onto
its representation on the map. It follows from Brouwer’s theorem that the
map of Wassenaar that I have in front of me has the property that one point
on the map coincides precisely with its pre-image.
Logician: Yes, of course, but you have to look really closely to see it. The
fixpoint is the location of NIAS on the map. There is also a more procedural
analogy for fixpoints. This is perhaps more illuminating in the context of
common knowledge. Suppose you are painting your walls and you would like
to mix exactly the same kind of beige as the small amount you have still left
in your tin, which you now dub your “reference tin”. Then you take a large
new tin of white paint, and you keep adding small drops of brown and mixing,
until you think you’ve almost attained the intended beige. At that moment
you add a drop from the reference tin to the new mixture, without mixing, and
look closely whether the reference drop is still darker than the new mixture.
If it is, you go on adding drops of brown to the new tin and mixing, taking
care to check at regular intervals. If you’re careful, this procedure is bound to
lead to the fixpoint. This works much better than trying out your new paint
on the wall next to the old beige!
Philosopher: I like this. Let us move on.
5A lucid account of this material is in Davey and Priestley’s textbook [10].
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Logician: As you all know, an agent a is said to know ϕ in a state s if the
proposition ϕ holds in all states that a cannot distinguish from s. These
are called the “accessible” situations. Intuitively, “accessible from s” means
“consistent with a’s information in state s”. You can picture this as a link
with a label for the agent. If a state s where p is true is linked for agent a to
a state s′ where p is not true, this represents the fact that a does not know
whether p is the case.
Philosopher: So when you talk about what agents know about what other
agents know, this corresponds to more than one such step.
Logician: That’s right. Let’s take the case of two agents, Alice and Bob, who
want to achieve common knowledge on who is going to collect the kids from
daycare. Common knowledge is important here, for it is not enough that Alice
knows that Bob knows that it is his turn today. Bob should also know that
she knows. And so it goes on. (writes on the whiteboard:)
1 — Alice — 2 — Bob — 3 — Alice 4 — Bob — 5 — · · ·
So there is a path, with a link from state 1 to state 2 for Alice because Alice
cannot distinguish these states, followed by a link from 2 to 3 for Bob, for
Bob cannot tell 2 and 3 apart, and so on. Something is common knowledge
for Alice and Bob if it is true in all situations that are on such a path.
Philosopher: Ah, now I see how fixpoints come in. For common knowledge
you have to compute the transitive closure of the union of the accessibility
relations for Alice and Bob.
Logician: Exactly.
Computer Scientist: Let me elaborate. The fixpoint procedure for making a
relation transitive goes like this:
1. Check if all two-step transitions can be done in a single step. If so, the
relation is transitive, and done.
2. If not, add all two-step transitions as new links, and go back to 1.
Wait, let me draw a picture.
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1 2 3 4 5
Philosopher: I suppose we can think of the link from 1 to 2 as a link for Alice,
and the link from 2 to 3 as a link for Bob, and so on?
Computer Scientist: That’s right, but I have blurred the distinction by taking
the union of Alice’s and Bob’s links. Anyway, our check reveals that not all two
step transitions can be done in single leaps, so the relation is not transitive.
In the first step, we add all two-step links as new links:
1 2 3 4 5
Now we check again. No, this is not yet transitive. So we add all two-step
links in this new picture as extra links:
1 2 3 4 5
Philosopher: I can see that this is an example of a fixpoint procedure. You are
changing the relation step by step, until it has the required property. After
your final step the relation has indeed become transitive: all states are now
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connected by direct links. So a proposition is common knowledge between
Alice and Bob if it is true in all those states.
Computer Scientist: I have another nice example for this, a simple card game
situation [12]. Consider the situation where Alice, Bob and Carol each receive
a card from the set red, white and blue. They can all see their own card, but
not those of the others. I will draw a possible worlds model of this situation.
(draws on the whiteboard:)
wrb rwb bwr brw
wbr rbw
Each world represents a card distribution in alphabetical order of the agents,
with obvious color abbreviations. For example, wbr represents the state in
which Alice has white, Bob has blue and Carol has red. The solid lines are
for Alice. If she has white, she can see that she has white, but she cannot
distinguish wbr from wrb. And similarly for the cases where she holds blue,
and for the cases where she holds red.
Philosopher: Let me see. Then the dotted arrows must represent Bob’s knowl-
edge relation, and the dashed arrows Carol’s. So now one can say things like
“Alice holds white” by means of propositional atoms such as wAlice.
Computer Scientist: That’s right. “Alice holds white” is true in wbr and wrb
but not in the other four worlds. Also, in both of these worlds “Alice knows
that she holds white” is true, for the knowledge relation for Alice links wbr
and wrb, and links no other worlds to these two, and in both of these wAlice
is true.
Philosopher: So in situation wbr it is common knowledge among Alice, Bob
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and Carol that Alice doesn’t know that Bob has blue? (writes on the white-
board:)
wbr |= C{Alice,Bob,Carol}¬KAlicebBob
Computer Scientist: That’s right. This is because all six worlds can be reached
from wbr in one or more steps by accessibility relations for agents in the group,
and it is clear that ¬KAlicebBob in all worlds, for it holds everywhere that Alice
can access at least one world in which Bob doesn’t have blue.
Logician: There is a slight further subtlety. In the literature one finds both
the transitive closure, and the reflexive transitive closure as definitions of the
accessibility relation for common knowledge. The first is common among
philosophers, and the second among computer scientists. Even standard text-
books take different stances on this issue.6 When modeling knowledge and not
belief, both definitions amount to the same, because of the assumed property
that known propositions are true. Nobody is so presumptuous as to claim the
opposite implication that truths are always known. Computer scientists are
more interested in knowledge. But for beliefs there is a real difference, and
the most natural interpretation of common belief uses transitive closure only.
Philosopher: If you do not require that individual beliefs are true but then all
of a sudden require that common beliefs are true, you get a rather confusing
mix. So I suppose the philosophers were right in proposing transitive closure
for both common knowledge and common belief.
Computer Scientist: When reading about societal problems like climate change,
the confusing thing is the disagreement about what is common knowledge and
what is common belief, which sometimes amounts to a common illusion.
Logician: Yes, and what makes it worse is that there are certain think-tanks
involved in the Republican War on Science [30] who are trying to create a
common illusion that the greenhouse effect is a common illusion. But maybe
we should save these matters for another discussion and stay with our present
topic now. (See page ??.)
Cognitive Scientist: I am still puzzled about some aspects of this common
knowledge. In developmental psychology, even though we at some stage think
6Meyer and van der Hoek [28] take the reflexive transitive closure; Fagin et al. [15] the
transitive closure.
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to discover the presence of a theory of mind, we find it very hard to explain
how such knowledge of others’ knowledge is formed. Are we to think of this
as some kind of category shift? Something that is not there initially, and then
appears all of a sudden? If I understand this fixpoint process right, it must be
very hard to achieve common knowledge in real-life situations. Can anyone
say more about how this is possible?
Logician: I see this picture of computing transitive closure by means of a
gradual process of adding links to a relation has confused you, and I am
sorry. You should not think about common knowledge as a new relation
that gets computed in stages, but as something that can be achieved in one
go. Common knowledge of ϕ can be seen as the result of removing all non-ϕ
situations from the picture. This can be done very easily, by means of a public
announcement. Think of the card situation again. Suppose Alice suddenly
says aloud: “I am holding white”. Then the picture simplifies to this:
wrb wbr
Now it has become common knowledge that Alice holds white. And it is com-
mon knowledge that the only uncertainty that remains is Alice’s uncertainty
about the cards of Bob and Carol.
Cognitive Scientist: So the result of publicly announcing ϕ is that ϕ will
become common knowledge.
Logician: Well, not quite. Suppose instead of “I am holding white”, Alice
would have announced “I am holding white, but you guys don’t know it yet.”
Then the second part of this becomes false as an effect of the announcement.
Philosopher: Alice is using a variation on the famous Moore sentence [31,
p.543]: “I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did.”
Logician: Yes, the effect can be truly destructive. “Your wife is cheating you,
but you don’t know it yet.” After that announcement the addressee does
know, so the statement has made itself false.
Cognitive Scientist: Moore sentences have the property that you cannot truth-
fully repeat them. So indeed, not all ϕ can be made common knowledge by
publicly announcing them. I see that now.
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Computer Scientist: By the way, the application of fixpoints to the logic of
knowledge may originate with John McCarthy. In a small note in the early
1970s that at the stage he did not even consider important enough to publish7
McCarthy formalizes two logical puzzles, one called the “Wise Men” puzzle
(this is also known as “Muddy Children”), and the other a puzzle about
numbers, called the “Sum and Product”-riddle. In the course of solving those
riddles he almost off-handedly introduces the reflexive transitive closure of
accessibility relations, and he uses this to account for what agents learn from
the announcements made in those riddles. He also promises a further analysis
in terms of a knowledge function, and handling time and learning, but I don’t
think that follow-up paper ever appeared.
Cognitive Scientist: So it seems we have another pioneer of the logic of com-
mon knowledge.
Logician: A lucid account of the interaction of public announcement and
common knowledge can be found in a short note by Johan van Benthem
from 2000, available on internet [5]. The crucial logical operation here is
relativization. Imagine an information state involving several agents, with
several worlds connected by agent accessibilities. Then the effect of a public
announcement A is that all non-A worlds get eliminated from the picture. Van
Benthem’s key observation is that this semantic process of elimination of non-
A worlds has as its syntactic counterpart the well-known logical operation of
relativization of a formula to A. In the model that results from updating with
the public announcement A a formula ϕ is true if and only if the relativization
of ϕ to A is true in the original model. In the note Van Benthem then
introduces the concept of relativized common knowledge, and conjectures that
relativized common knowledge cannot be expressed in terms of plain common
knowledge.
Computer Scientist: That squares well with an observation in Baltag et al.’s
[2]. There it is shown that there is no sentence of the language of epistemic
logic extended with a common knowledge operator that expresses “after public
announcement of ϕ it is common knowledge that ψ”.
Philosopher: I suppose relativized common knowledge is common knowledge
relativized to an announcement? So it expresses what has to be true in a
model before the public announcement in order to create common knowledge
after the announcement?
7It was only later included in an overview of previously unpublished notes [27].
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Logician: More precisely, after a ϕ announcement it is plain common knowl-
edge that ψ if and only if it is ϕ-relativized common knowledge that after
a ϕ announcement ψ holds. Later on, Van Benthem showed together with
Van Eijck and Kooi [4] that if you take propositional dynamic logic as your
epistemic language then the effect of any update that can be represented as
a so-called finite action model is expressible in the epistemic language.
Philosopher: I thought propositional dynamic logic was designed for reasoning
about the correctness of computer programs.
Computer Scientist: That’s right. Propositional dynamic logic, or PDL for
short, is an extension of Hoare logic.
Logician: But the beauty of formal systems is that they can be reinterpreted
and reused. For instance, PDL has a construct for program composition:
first execute program P , next execute program Q. We can reinterpret this to
express the epistemic relation of what Alice knows about Bob’s knowledge.
Similarly, PDL has a construction for non-deterministic choice between two
programs P and Q. We can reinterpret this as the relation of what Alice
and Bob both know. Finally, PDL can express reflexive transitive closure, for
executing a program P an arbitrary finite number of times. We reinterpret
that as the reflexive transitive closure of a knowledge relation.
Philosopher: And taken together these PDL constructs can express common
knowledge?
Logician: Yes, common knowledge between Alice and Bob that ϕ is expressed
as follows. (writes on the white-board)
[(a ∪ b)∗]ϕ
This is true if in every world that is reachable via the reflexive transitive
closure of the union of the accessibility relations of Alice and Bob it holds
that ϕ.
Philosopher: That is indeed what common knowledge amounts to. Now I
suppose that PDL also has a construct that can be used to express relativized
common knowledge?
Logician: Right again. For that you need PDL-tests, formulas that check
that a condition holds somewhere in a program. The familiar programming
construct of ‘if ϕ then P else Q’ is expressed in PDL by: (writes on the
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white-board again)
(?ϕ;P ) ∪ (?¬ϕ;Q).
What you need for relativized common knowledge is test for a property along
a path, to express that in every world that is reachable via a sequence of ϕ
worlds along the reflexive transitive closure of the union of the accessibility
relations of Alice and Bob, it holds that ψ. Here is the formula: (writes on
the white-board)
[(?ϕ; (a ∪ b))∗]ψ.
Philosopher: Beautiful. Let me guess now. The principle that expresses the
effect of public announcements on common knowledge will state that after
public announcement of ϕ it has become common knowledge for Alice and
Bob that ψ if and only if it is already ϕ-relativized common knowledge for
Alice and Bob that ψ. Is that right?
Logician: Almost right. Let me use !ϕ for a public announcement. Then this
is what we get: (writes on the white-board)
[!ϕ][(a ∪ b)∗]ψ ↔ [(?ϕ; (a ∪ b))∗][!ϕ]ψ.
This has the shape of a reduction axiom: note that the public announcement
[!ϕ] occurs on both sides in the equivalence, but on the right-hand side the
formula it has scope over has lower complexity. This means that the axiom
can be used to define a translation from the language of PDL plus public an-
nouncement operators to the language of PDL without public announcement
operators. And in [4] it is shown that this trick not only works for pub-
lic announcements, but that something similar can be done for any update
action.
Cognitive Scientist: This bit on relativized common knowledge went over my
head, I am afraid. But I can appreciate the logical puzzles that have to do
with common knowledge, such as the Wise Men puzzle and this Sum and
Product riddle.
Computer Scientist: Then it may interest you that both of these riddles have
old roots. The wise men riddle occurs in a puzzle book by Gamow & Stern
from 1958 [20], but a friend of mine claims having seen this in Russian puzzle
books from the first half of the twentieth century. The ‘Sum and Product’
riddle almost certainly originates with the Dutch topologist Hans Freuden-
thal. He stated it in the Dutch-language mathematics journal Nieuw Archief
voor Wiskunde (New Archive for Mathematics) in 1969 [17] and presented its
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solution in the next issue [18]. McCarthy only later became aware of that
source of the riddle.8
Logician: In any case, it is clear that McCarthy’s promise of follow-up was
eventually fulfilled by the development of dynamic epistemic logic over the
past 25 years or so!9
8Details on the dissemination are in [11].
9Overviews of that development can be found in [15; 3; 12].
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